JOINT COMPANY/UNION SAFETY COMMITTEE CONCERN FORM

'- (Use Black Ink Only & Retain Copy For Your Records)
Mail: JCUSC, T690G

	Cas	se No. <u>90 -</u>	017
EMPLOYEE NA	AME EMPLOYEE N	MDED	
DEPARTMENT	224	SHIFT	1
SUPERVISOR	(Print) BUD CHAPMAN SUPV. EXT.		
	RT MANAGER (Print) KEN FRIEBERG MANAGER EXT.		
	ly discussed this Concern with Supervision: X Yes No.		
	y) POSSIBLE CROSS CONNECTIONS BETWEEN AIR BO	RN RADIO A	CTIVE
CONTAMIN	NATION AND DOMESTIC WATER SYSTEM THROUGH UNPRO	TECTED EME	RGENCY
SHOWER A	AND EYE BATH FIXTURE IN RADIO ACTIVE CONTROLLE	D AREA.	
(THIS SA	FETY CONCERN SHOULD HAVE IMMEDIATE ACTION)		
	1-11-90	/ /-	11-90
Employee Sign	ature Date Steward Signature	D	ate
Supervision R	esponse (within 5 working days) ————————————————————————————————————		<u> </u>
			-
	·		-
			<u> </u>
Supervision Sig	nature	. Date	
Direct Report M	lanager Signature	. Date	
NOTE: TIMELI	NESS IN COMPLETING THIS FORMAS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE.		
I am s	atisfied with the results I am not satisfied.		
Brief reason if r	not satisfied:		
	ature		
JCUSC receive	d Safety Concern on:		
	To be completed by the JCUSC Co-Chairperson(s)		
Assigned to:	Union: TRUE CERTOUA	Date / -//	-90
	Union: These LERTOUA Company: EDN TIETEN BERG	Date	-90
Distribution:	Safety Committee (White) Union Steward (Green) Employee (Goldenrod)		

RF-45500 (Rev. 10/89) Destroy Previous Issues





JOINT COMPANY - UNION SAFETY COMMITTEE

December 19, 1990

To:

PMO

Building 334 Ext.

From: E. I. Tietenberg / S. Cordova

Co-Chairmen JCUSC T-452-B / T-690-G Ext. 7620 / Ext. 5800

RE: CLOSE-OUT OF SAFETY CONCERN NUMBER 90-012 / POSSIBLE CROSS CONTAMINATION

Facilities Engineering has completed evaluation of the backflow preventers on the plantsite, and has identified actions to be performed in a letter to R. M. Nelson, Jr., DOE, from J. A. Kirkebo, EG&G, subject: Colorado Health Department Request For Cross Connection Control Survey, dated December 6, 1990 (attachment 1).

The actions listed in the letter we believe address your concerns pertaining to the back flow preventers. The JCUSC will turn the tracking of this concern over to Performance Assurance, where it will be incorporated into the Integrated Safety Program.

Thank you for your participation in the safety program. If you have any further problems with this concern, it's answer, or implementation, please feel free to contact the Joint Company/Union Safety Committee.

E. I. Tietenberg

Company Safety Co-Chairman

S. Cordova

Union Safety Co-Chairman

cc:

G. G. Balint

A. H. Burlingame

B. Chapman

B. M. Clausen

R. C. Cordova

K. J. Freiberg

J. R. Marschall

c190-012.et

corbes. Control OUTGOINS LTR NO.

20 RF4958

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ALLHOFF, F.H BRETZKE, J.C BURLINGAME, A.H. CROUCHER, D.W. DAVIS, J.G.

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KERSH, J.M.

KIRBY, W.A. KIRKEBO, J.A LEE, E.M.

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WIEBE. J.S WILKINSON, R.B. WILSON, J. M. YOUNG, E.A.

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MONTROSS, R.W. MORGAN, R.V.

,EG&G ROCKY FLATS

EG&G ROCKY FLATS, INC. ROCKY FLATS PLANT, P.O. BOX 464, GOLDEN, COLORADO 80402-0464 • (303) 966-7000

December 6, 1990

90-RF-4958

Robert M. Nelson, Jr.

Manager DOE, RFO

COLORADO HEALTH DEPARTMENT REQUEST FOR RESULTS OF THE CROSS CONNECTION CONTROL SURVEY (10576)

R. M. Nelson memorandum WMED:AB:10576 to J. O. Zane, Colorado Refs: (a) Health Department Request for Results of the Cross-Connection Control Survey, December 3, 1990

D. W. Ferrera ltr to R. M. Nelson, 90-RF-1936, Potential (b) Cross-Connection in Building 774, May 4, 1990

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the information requested in the December 3, 1990 letter referenced above.

BACKGROUND:

The cross connection control or backflow preventer (BFP) issue was originally addressed in reference (b). That letter provided a description of an incident involving a BFP in Building 774 and presented a plan and schedule on measures being taken to prevent cross connections at the plantsite. It was in response to the Colorado Department of Health (CDH) request for this information. This letter covers only the issue dealing with plantwide cross connection controls, as requested in reference (a).

CORRESCONTROL X X DISCUSSION

The detailed information requested by DOE in their December 3, 1990 letter is presented in Attachments A through G. Specifically, Items 1 through 6 in the DOE letter are covered in Attachment A. An additional item (No. 7) was included to respond to the risk to workers issue. Furthermore, EG&G Rocky Flats, Inc. will provide a monthly status report, starting January 1, 1991, showing progress of the cross connection control program.

In summary, although much has been accomplished, such as completion of survey of all BFPs, field verification of deficient BFPs, and field work on overall domestic water evaluation of Pu facilities, the overall effort has fallen behind the original schedule. A new schedule (Attachment E) is presented for your information. It incorporates lessons learned from work done in the Pu facilities and represents a more realistic effort required to perform the planned tasks.

CLASSIFICATION:

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

ALITHORIZED CLASSIFIER SIGNATURE

IN REPLY TO LTR NO.

PC# 1-024 LTR ARPROVALS: ORIG & TYPIST INITIALS

RF-46469 (Rev 11/90) VT/SAK

R. M. Nelson, Jr. December 6, 1990 90-RF-4958 Page 2

RESPONSE REQUIRED:

No response to this Tetter is required. If you have any questions, please contact Vic Terkun at extension 7113.

A. Kirkebo

Assistant General Manager

Engineering

EG&G Rocky Flats

VT:sak

Orig. and L cc - R. M. Nelson, Jr. w/o Attach. L cc - A. Barnard

Attachments: As Stated Information requested in the DOE letter of December 3, 1990, has been compiled and is summarized below.

I. "Findings from the survey and field verification to include the types of modifications or replacements and the reasons the devices do not meet specifications."

A total of 208 existing backflow preventers (BFPs) were inspected by Engineering using an evaluation form specifically developed for this purpose. All of the completed "Backflow Preventers BFPs Evaluation Sheet" forms are enclosed in Attachment B. Each BFP is listed on the form, it's compliance or non-compliance with the CDH criteria identified, and any necessary work to bring it in compliance, where needed, is stated. In addition, a summary sheet is included describing the different types of modifications or replacements and any reasons the existing BFPs did not meet the CDH Cross Connection Control Manual (CCCM) requirements.

Over half of the 208 BFPs inspected required modifications and/or replacements. The majority of the modifications were due to improper air gaps, some were obsolete models with slight leaks or missing valves, and others were replacement of functioning BFPs but not on the CDH approved list. There were also 17 new BFPs that Engineering decided should be installed. Most of these to be used for segregating buildings from the site water supply loop. The new installations did not represent direct or even an indirect cross connections. The CCCM, in Section 4.10, requires a BFP to be installed at the service entrance to a building where chemicals or radioactive materials are processed. A CDH representative has acknowledged verbally that this requirement does not apply at Rocky Flats Plant, but Engineering has received nothing in writing to relieve Rocky Flats Plant of this requirement.

Engineering completed designs for 60 BFPs and Maintenance installed approximately 20, with the majority in Building 559. In addition, all deficiencies previously identified by Preventive Maintenance Operations (PMO) were checked first to insure none of them represented an immediate safety hazard as outlined in Phase II. Also, the development of line diagrams for the overall domestic water (DW) systems is nearing completion for Pu facilities, with most of the field work being completed. CADD drawings are now being prepared for these buildings and an evaluation of the DW system by buildings has been started. A summary of the current status of BFPs located inside and outside the PSZ is presented in Attachment C. For each building, the tables show how many BFPs were surveyed, the number of Maintenance Work Orders (MWO) requiring designs, the status of design packages, and line diagram drawings produced. Specific MWO generated for various buildings are listed in Attachment D. For each MWO, a brief description is given summarizing what needs to be done to the BFP.

2. "Funding requirements to make these modifications or replacements".

Engineering estimates that \$500,000 is required for FY91 to perform the

BFP study. This study consists of three phases. Phase I includes the survey of all existing BFPs and designs for modifications/ replacements. Phase II of the study covers review and field verification of BFPs which PMO identified as having possible deficiencies. Phase III consists of evaluation of the overall domestic water (DW) systems in each of the buildings on plantsite. This phase includes 1) field surveys to develop line-diagrams of the DW system and all of its branches, 2) generating CADD drawings for each building, 3) performing an engineering evaluation of the DW system to insure proper installation of BFPs and 4) issuing designs for additional BFPs that are needed.

To date, Engineering identified 125 existing BFPs requiring modifications/replacements. An additional 17 new units will need to be installed. Also, after overall DW system evaluation, there may be additional BFPs required. It is estimated the cost to install and modify existing units will be between \$1.5 and \$2.0 million for material and labor.

The current project total cost for Engineering and installations is estimated at \$2.0 to \$2.5 million out of the Expense Budget.

The above estimate does not include the cost for the design and installation of the BFPs on the fire water systems. Presently, the fire water lines entering various buildings are equipped with a single check valve. This does not meet the CDH criteria and double check valves are required. Since the fire water system does not represent the same level of health hazard as the DW system (per CDH CCCM section 4.2.2), it has been given a lower priority. Therefore, the BFPs for the fire water are scheduled to be worked on after completing the DW BFP installation. It is expected to start in FY92 and is estimated to cost between \$3.5 to \$4.5 million. A scope and estimate will be done first to get a better idea on the cost and schedule for the project.

3. "A summary of concerns and reasons for not meeting the previously agreed upon schedule".

Although much has been accomplished, the overall effort has fallen behind the original schedule due to a greater number of BFPs requiring design packages, and the level of effort needed to produce these designs, than originally assumed. The initial schedule was based on finding 30 to 40 BFPs requiring modifications/replacements instead of the 125 existing and 17 new ones. There have also been safety, security, and building operational changes which had a significant impact on the original schedule. Most of the initial schedule slip occurred in designs, installations, and line diagrams (Phase III) for Pu facilities. Additional slippage is due to manpower shortage and training of new AE personnel since they have to go through a learning period.

"A revised schedule for obtaining compliance".

The revised schedule (Attachment E) reflects the time necessary to

design and install the greatly increased number of replacements or modifications to existing BFPs. Furthermore, with the field work experience gained in performing overall domestic water system evaluations (Phase III), the updated schedule reflects a more realistic effort required to perform those tasks.

5. "An organizational chart with identification of assignments and responsibilities by individuals for meeting the revised schedule".

See Attachment F for a list of individuals and organizations responsible for meeting the revised schedule.

6. . "A summary of the November 21, 1990, conference call to CDH".

See Attachment G which summarized the conference call to CDH.

7. "In addition, EG&G safety and engineering units need to review available data to determine the risk to workers' safety and to identify needed mitigation".

Based on the evaluation of just the existing individual BFPs, Engineering is able to make the following conclusions/observations;

- The existing BFPs seem to be performing their intended function and no evidence of immediate health hazard to workers from non-operating BFP was found.
- Most units being replaced are for the purpose of meeting CDH requirements and not because the BFPs do not function. Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment qualitatively judged that considering the probability of failure of BFPs, and the resulting consequence to the workers, the risk would be much less than presented in the Final Safety Analysis Reports.
- Engineering was aware of several fire protection systems containing glycol, which the Fire Department has been replacing with dry pipe systems. However, there may be 10 buildings that have a propylene glycol/water mixture in extensions of the sprinkler supply piping outside each building. According to the Fire Department, propylene glycol is not toxic (as opposed to ethylene glycol which is toxic).

Looking at just the existing BFP gives an incomplete picture. To assess the risk to workers, an evaluation of the overall DW system is required. Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment and Engineering will assess the adequacy of DW protection after the line diagrams are completed. Each building will have CADD drawings showing the DW routing and branches off the DW lines, as well as all existing BFPs. Once there drawings are available, an evaluation of the DW system and the decision to add or remove any BFPs can then be made.

BFP MAINTENANCE WORK ORDER SUMMARY

in the second se			
TYPE OF CORRECT	TION A	REASON FOR MAKING CORRECTION	NUMBER OF BFPs
		• •	N. A.
A_ Replace		I_ Improper configur2_ Wrong Application3_ Leaking/obsolete	ation IO
		4. Failed CDH test 5. Not CDH approved	18 12
B_ Repair		I. Improper air gapZ. Improper configur3. Leaking	42 ation 8
C_ Remove		I_ BFP not needed Z_ Redundant	£ 6 2
D. New instal	Tation	<pre>I_ Service entrance 2_ Additional safety</pre>	II 5
		TOTAL	I42

BACKFLOW PREVENTER (BFP) EVALUATION SHEET FOR COMPLIANCE WITH COH CROSS CONNECTION CONTROL

Manufacturer: Hobe Model No. Serial No.: 10520 Equipment	4202 3/4 column No.: M5/M. : 835-B /4 : No.: 325-084
Flow Media Temp: Hot X Cold Upstream (Inlet) - (a) potable (b) other (explain) - (a) potable (b) other (explain)	Downstream (Outlet) (a) potable (b) other (explain) (compared weather)
State justification for the Backflow Pr	eventer at this location
X REDUCED PRESSURE TYPE: a) Inches above finished floor 4-8 b) Diameter of the supply line 34	Must be at Teast IZ inches
c) Air gap d) Installation	
of fighte the isolation valves	C No
egh Proper tastcocks X Yes _	each shut-off valve, check valves and the diff relief
h) Water Teaks	replaced after failing the next pmo (15). No. 15 nair or replace
i) Proper freeze N/A Yes	N- ide proper
a) Inches above — 1	12 inches
e) If is (GIVEN De cope	er fix state sacoii-
Is va standi	Juda water
d) Are the valves	
No.	

e)	Are the isolation	Yes	No	.If "No," must be replaced after failing the next PMO
·	•	Yaa	11 -	test.
T]	Proper testcocks	—162 —	no	.Must have approved testcock
•	•			before each shut-off valve
				and each check valve. (If
	• ,		_	"No," must be replaced after
-1	Matan Tasks	V	No	failing the next PMO test.)
	Water Teaks	Yes		If "Yes," repair or replace
п)	Proper freeze protectionN/A	Yes	Na	TE THE Promise and
	procecularwx			If "No," provide proper
	PRESSURE TYPE VACUUM BREAK	FD -	ودوسي	proceedion .
3)	Inches above highest point			Must be at least 12 inches
	Are there isolation	_Yes		.Must have two
- /.	valves			
C)	Are the isolation			$\mathcal{T}_{\mathcal{Z}}$
	valves CDH approved?	Yes	No	.If "No, " must be replaced
				after failing the next PMO
	•			test.
_ d)	Proper tastcocks	Yes	No.	.Must have approved testcock
				before the check valve (If
				No. provide proper protec-
				tion.)
	Water Teaks	Yes	_No	If "Yes," repair or replace
一 f)	Proper freeze			
	protection N/A	_Yez	_Na	If "No," provide proper
ے ۔۔۔۔	EACH PER STATE OF THE P			protection
₹.	Exposed to toxic or poisons or air borne dust	ous rume:		The RM of the Control
	or air dorne dust		_Na	If "Yes," it must be
				replaced with non-vacuum
	ing and the second of the seco			type BFP.
•	ATMOSPHERIC VACUUM BREAKER	•		
3)	Inches above highest point		i ka jir	Must be at least 12 inches
	Shut-off valves and men			
<u></u> •,	i) Upstream	Yes	Na	Must have a shut-off valve
-	ii) Downstream	Yes		No valves shall be installed
	Water Teaks		Na	.If "Yes," repair or replace.
	Proper freeze			
-,	protectionN/A	_Yes	No	.If "No," provide proper
-			_	protection
e)	Exposed to toxic fumes or		:17- "	· ·
•	air borne dust	Yes	No	If "Yes," it must be
			المراجعة المستوا	replaced with non-vacuum
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BACKFLOW PREVENTER(BFP) REPLACEMENT STUDY (HEADING DESCRIPTIONS)

•		FAC	ILITIES	ENGINEER!	DKI		į				DEFICIENT BFP'S	LINE DIAGRAMS
BLDG (#8FP) (A)	EXISTING SURVEYED (B)	ADG'L REQ'D (C)	HWO'S CEN. (D)	DESIGN.	REVIEU (F)	FIXAL (G)	REC'D (H)	IN PRO	x	P_	DEFIC/ SURVEYED	FIELD/ DRANG CLI

A----BUILDING NUMBER (NUMBER OF BFP'S IN THE BUILDING).

-----ADDITIONAL 3FP'S REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF THE QUICK SURVEY OF THE AREA.

--- HUMBER OF THE DESIGN PACKAGES SUBMITTED FOR REVIEW.

G-HUMBER OF DESIGN PACKAGES COMPLETED.

HUNBER OF DESIGN PACKAGES RECEIVED BY MAINTENANCE.

K-----NUMBER OF BFP's IDENTIFIED BY PMO IN PHASE II WITH DEFICIENCIES/SURVEYED.

L----FIELD WALK DOWN OF DOMESTIC WATER SYSTEM/NUMBER OF CADO DRAWINGS COMPLETED.

		FAC	ILITIES E	NGINEERING				ere ere	;- :-	DEFICIENT 8FP'S	LINE
	•	2	17.	<u>.</u> .	- 1			MAINTENANCE	•	********	
SLDG (#SFP)	EXISTING: SURVEYED:	ADD'L RED'D	HUC'S	esica R	EAIER	FINAL	REC'D	IN PROG	; COMP.	DEFIC/ SURVEYED	FIELD/ DRAMG
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LEGEND

X--COMPLETED

G--NOT COMPLETED

UPDATED 12/05/90

BACKFLOW PREVENTER (BFP) REPLACEMENT STUDY

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LEGENO

X--COMPLETED

G--HOT COMPLETED

12/05/90

UPDATED

12/05/90

PSZ BUILDINGS BACKFLOW PREVENTER (BFP) SURVEY/REPLACEMENT PHASE

EQ#	81.0#	HWO#	DESCRIPTION	SURVEY COMPL	MAC WRITTEN	DESIGN REVIEW	DESIGN FINAL	DESIGN TO NTCE
		657137	INSTALL BFP	6/26/90	2/12/90	8/14/90	10/18/90	10/23/90
HEM	371 371	666371		6/26/90		8/14/90		.,
NE¥ 084	371 371	666370					11/14/90	11/16/90
136	371	666372	REPLACE SFP	6/26/90	6/26/90	10/11/90		
170	371	666369	REPLACE SFP	6/26/90	6/26/90	8/14/90		
234	371	666377		6/25/90				
134	373	664785	REPLACE ISOLATION VALVE			6/18/90	8/14/90	8/16/90
135	373	664786	REPLACE ISOLATION VALVE					
137	374	664784	REPAIR ISOLATION VALVE		6/05/90			
138	374	000000		6/05/90				
HEM	559	655284		4/23/90	4/23/90	4/26/90	4/25/90	4/26/90
189	559		CANNOT LOCATE					
005	559	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	4/28/90				
086	559	662297		4/28/90			5/09/90	
087	559	662299		4/28/90				
088	559	662300	REHOVE SFP	4/28/90	4/28/90	5/04/90	5/09/90	5/11/90
089	559	662614	REPLACE 3FP	4/28/90	5/02/90		5/09/90	
090	559	662616	REPLACE BFP	5/02/90			5/09/90	
097	559	662613	REPLACE SFP	5/02/90	5/02/90		5/09/90	
092	559	662302		4/28/90			5/09/90	
093	559	662301	REMOVE 3FP	4/28/90				
095	559	662306	REMOVE 3FP		4/28/90			
096	559	662308	REMOVE HOSEBIE AND BFP					
097	559	662307	REMOVE HOSEBIB AND BFP		4/28/90			5/11/90
098	559	662304	REMOVE SFP	4/28/90			5/09/90	5/11/90
099	559	662615	REPLACE BFP	5/02/90			5/09/90	
100	559	662305	REMOVE 3FP	4/28/90			5/09/90	5/11/90
216	559	662296	PROVIDE AIR GAP	4/28/90			5/09/90	
226	559	662295	REPLACE 3FP		4/28/90		5/09/90	3/11/90
227	560	664781	REPLACE ISOLATION VALVE			6/18/90		
XEM	561	663757	REPLACE CHECK VALVE	5/18/90				(/40 /00
083	561	664044	REPLACE W/COH APPVO	5/18/90			6/18/90	
084	561	663758	REPLACE W/CDH APPVO		5/18/90			0/ 19/9U
162	561	663759	PROVIDE AIR GAP	5718/90	3/18/90	10/11/90	. • •	
123	701	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	8/03/90				
117	702	000000	NO WORK HEEDED	8/02/90	4 /27 /00			
118	703	665492	PROVIDE AIR GAP	8/02/90		5/17/00	5/21/90	5/22/90
101	705	663241	PROVIDE AIR GAP	5/08/90	5/0 8 /90 6/27/90	5/17/90 8/14/90	J/ C . / 7U	70
102	706	665499	REPLACE 3FP	6/25/90		5/12/90	5/16/90	5/18/90
977	707	663197	PROVIDE AIR GAP	5/08/90 5/08/90			5/16/90	5/18/90
078	707	663242	PROVIDE AIR GAP	5/08/90		5/12/90	5/16/90	5/18/90
07 9	707	663244	PROVIDE AIR GAP	5/08/90	5/10/90	5/12/90	5/16/90	5/18/90
194	707	663196	REPLACE 3FP	5/08/90	5/08/90	5/17/90	5/21/90	5/22/90
081	708	663251	PROVIDE AIR GAP	3/40/30	37 007 70	J, 11/70	3, 2, 1, 10	

PSZ BUILDINGS BACKFLOW PREVENTER (BFP) SURVEY/REPLACEMENT PHASE

E0#	3 L D#	HUO#	DESCRIPTION	SURVEY	HIIG WRITTEN	DESIGN REVIEW	DESIGN FINAL	DESIGN TO HTCE
		 663508	REPIPE SFP	5/08/90	5/15/90	6/29/90	8/14/90	8/16/90
082	709	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	8/08/90				
066 080	718 731	300000	REPLACE BFP	8/06/90	8/06/90			
- 074	750		PROVIDE AIR GAP	8/02/90	8/02/90			
111	762	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	7/15/90				
NEM	771	664138	INSTALL BFP	5/24/90	5/24/90	6/18/90	8/15/90	8/21/90
NEW	771	664783	INSTALL BFP	6/04/90	6/04/90	6/29/90		
NEX	771	666373	INSTALL BFP	6/25/90	6/27/90			
NEW	771	666375	INSTALL BFP	.6/26/90	6/27/90	8/14/90	11/26/90	11/28/90
127	771	663507	PROVIDE AIR GAP	5/14/90	5/14/90	5/31/90	6/07/90	6/11/90
128	771	663504	REPLACE BFP	5/14/90	5/14/90			
129	771	663505	REPLACE BFP	5/14/90	5/14/90	5/30/90	6/18/9 0	
130	771	663502	REPLACE BFP	· 📑 5/14/90	5/14/90	5/24/90	6/07/90	
131	771	663503	REPLACE SFP	5/14/90	5/14/90	5/24/90	6/07/90	
132	771	663506	PROVIDE AIR GAP	5/14/90	5/14/90	5/31/90	6/07/90	
147	771	663501	REPLACE SFP	5/14/90	5/14/90°	5/24/90	6/07/90	
218	771	663500	REPLACE SFP	5/14/90	5/14/90		6/18/9Œ	6/19/9Œ
NEST	775	666374	ADD: SFP		6/25/90	8/14/90	,	
· 133	774	661843	BFP REPLACEMENT		4/23/90	4/30/90	4/30/90	5/20/90
NEW.	776	667153	INSTALL BFP		7/06/90			
107	776	663672	REPLACE FOR HOT WATER		5/16/90			
113	776	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	6/28/90				
114	776	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	6/28/90				
119	776	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	6/28/90				
120	776	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	6/28/90	=			
121	776	667152	REMOVE BFP	7/06/90	7/06/90			
122	776	667150	REMOVE 3FP	7/06/90	7/06/90			
211	776	667154	REPLACE SFP	7/06/90	7/06/90	F 671 696	£ /07 /08	4/15/00
213	776	663673	PROVIDE AIR GAP	5/16/90		5/31/90		11/12/90
###	776	665773	REMOVE VAC. SREAKER	5/21/90	5/21/90	8/14/90		11/22/90
###	776	665774	REMOVE VAC. BREAKER	5/21/90	5/21/90	8/14/90	11/20/70	11722,70
MEM	777	664780	INST BEP SERV ENTRAN		6/01/90	10/11/90		
103	777	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	7/09/90	7 /00 /00			
104	777	667019	PROVIDE AIR GAP	7/09/90	7/09/90		•	
105	777	666316	PROVIDE AIR GAP	7/09/90	7/09/90			
106	777	667017	REPLACE WITH BEP	7/09/90				
109	777	667011	PROVIDE AIR GAP		7/09/90			
210	777	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	6/01/90	5/30/90	6/18/90	10/18/00	10/22/90
214	777	664610	REPLACE 3FP	5/30/90	5/30/90	cancell	10, 10, 70	149 444 74
215	777	664611	REPLACE SFP	5/30/90	7730770	CORNELL		

PSZ BUILDINGS BACKFLOW PREVENTER (BFP) SURVEY/REPLACEMENT PHASE

EC	n≢ 3L	D#	MUCH	DESCRIPTI	CM	SURVEY COMPL	MMG URITTEN	DESIGN REVIEW		DESTON
NE	y 77	3 6	64139	INSTALL N	EW 3FP	5/25/90	5/25/90	10/12/90		
10	18 77	3 6	63671	REPAIR PE	R FE DRAWING	\$ 5/16/90	5/16/90	6/20/90	10/19/90	1 10/31/90
11	IZ 77	3 0	00000	NO WORK N	<u>ස</u> ාහ	5/25/90				
12	24 77	9 6	655 0 3	PROVIDE A	IR GAP	7/16/90	4/20/90	***	و المستورة التاريخ والمستورسية التاريخ	
12	25 77	7 0	00000	NO WORK N	EEDED	7/16/90				
12	26 77	9 6	45500	PROVIDE A	IR GAP	7/16/90	4/20/90	10/11/90	, -	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
23	sa 77	7 6	65501	PROVIDE A	IR GAP	7/02/90	4/20/90	11/9/90		
14	4 78	z 0	00000	NO. WORK N	ළු ව	 8/02/90				
23	sa 78	3 0	00000	NG WORK N	<u>ස</u> ාව	8/03/9 0				
#	# 78	8 0	00000	NO WORK N	ණ න	8/6/90		- :	*	
18	3T 91	Œ		REPLACE B	FP	8/03/90	8/03/90	• • •		
18	32 91	a 0	00000	NO WORK N	ED D	E 8/06/90				
18	33. 91	C		REPLACE 8	FP	8/06/90	8/06/90	-		
. 18	34 91	0		REPLACE 8	FP	8/03/90	8/03/90			
18	35 91	α.		REPLACE S	FP	8/03/90	8/03/90			
- 18	37 91	at a	00000	NO: WORK N	<u>ම</u> ෙව	8/07/90			5.	
- 2	22 92	<u> </u>	00000	NO WORK N	655	8/06/90				
: z	23. 92	25 0	100000	NOT WORK N	EDD \	8/07/90				
. Ot	35 96	8		REPLACE B	FP	8/06/90	8/06/90			
0.6	59 99	PCT .		REPLACE S	FP	8/06/90	8/06/90		September 1999	اسريحا للسوود وموزم والرا
NE	EU 99	71		INSTALL B	FP	7/30/90	7/30/90			• .
G.	70 99	71 6	66252	REPLACE A	IR GAP	7/30/90	4/19/90			
a:	71 - 95	71 0	100000	HO WORK H	ED 8	7/30/90				
a:	72 99	71		PROVIDE A	IR GAP	7/30/90	7/30/90			
18	36. 99	71 0	100000	NO WORK N	:E35	7/30/90		٠.		
2	57 99	77 6	666276	REPLACE B	(FP	7/30/90	4/19/90			
2	58 99	71 6	66233	REPLACE B	IFP .	7/30/90	4/19/90			

NON PSZ BUILDING BACKFLOW PREVENTER (BFP) SURVEY/REPLACEMENT PHASE

					•				
					SURVEY	MHG	DESIGN	DESIGN	DESIGN TO HTCE
	EC#	BLD#	HIJC#	DESCRIPTION	COMPL	WILLIAM	REVIEW	FINAL	10 H162
_	001	111	777777	? ????? ???	8/27/90				
	002	111	000000	NO. WORK NEEDED	8/27/90			,	
	003	111	??????	777777777	<u>8/27/90</u>			: .	
	250	111	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	8/27/90	•			
	246	112	672571	RELOCATE HOSE BIBB	8/29/90	8/29/90	10/3/90	10/19/90	10/25/90
	247	112	77????	??????????	8/29/90				
	251	115	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	8/27/90				
	NEW	119	667504	REPLACE VACUUM BREAKE	R. 7/10/90	7/10/90	10/2/20	10/17/90	10/19/90
	139	119	000000	HO WORK NEEDED	7/10/90				
	245	120	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	· · · 8/29/90				
	006	122	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	6/19/90				
	007	122	666518	SUPPLY WATER	6/26/90			8/20/90	
	NEA	122	663881	SCRUB TABLE 3FP	6/1/90			7/02/90	
	004	123.	658387	REPLACE 3FP	6/12/90	3/05/90	9/21/90	10/10/90	10/12/90
	009	123	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	<u> </u>				
٠.	ora	125	000000	NOT WORK NEEDED	8/14/90		. • • •		
	GIT.	123	000000	NO. WORK NEEDED	357 8/14/90		ر. در ب د ه د	-	
;-·	012	123	000000	NOT WORK WEEDED	<i>₹</i> 8/14/90			1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	**************************************
	148	123.	668587	REPLACE BFP	8/14/90	7/26/90	8/22/90	9/14/90	9/17/90
	249	123	669996	RELOCATE HOSE SIBS	8/14/90	8/14/90	9/26/9 0	10/10/90	10/12/90
	255	123	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	6/12/90				
	15T	124							,
	152	124	665776	REPLACE BFP W/APPRVD	6/15/90	6/15/90	6/22/90	8/15/90	8/24/90
	153	124							
	Q13	125	000000	HOL WORK NEEDED	7/10/90				
	014	125	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	8/27/90				
	NEW	130	664037	INSTALL BFP	6/20/90	6/15/90	6/30/90	8/06/90	8/06/90
	053	130	670436	REPLACE BFP	8/16/90	8/16/90			
	235	130	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	6/26/90			•	
	240	130	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	6/26/90				
	241	131	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	8/16/90				
	242	131	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	8/16/90				
	244	131	670429	REPLACE BFP	8/16/90	8/16/90		•	
	015	218	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	6/26/90				
	219	250	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	6/25/90				
	016	331	667674	REPLACE SEP	7/13/90	6/12/90	8/20/90	9/14/90	9/17/90
	017	331	664087	ISOLATE CAR WASH	6/01/90		6/18/90	7/05/90	7/06/90
	018	331	667688	R/R BFP	8/09 /90	7/14/90	9/11/90	9/27/90	10/1/90
	020	334	669621	REPLACE SFP	8/09 /90	8/09/90			
	156	334	669622	REPLACE FUNNEL	6/05/90	8/09/90			
	252	334	669620	REPLACE HOSE 3188	8/09/90				
	HEW	334	665773	INSTALL PRESSURE BFP	6/14/90	6/15/90	7/02/90	8/22/90	8/24/90
	(1 L. 70		5555						

NON PSZ BUILDING BACKFLOW PREVENTER (BFP) SURVEY/REPLACEMENT PHASE

	ro#	31_D#	HUC#	DESCRIPTION	SURVEY	HUO WRITTEN	DESIGN	DESIGN DESIGN	
	EG#	- BLU#		**************************************					-
	027	439	672065	PROVIDE AIR GAP	- 11/8/90	9/12/90	• .		
	028	440	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	11/1/90				
	023	441	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	6/28/90		- 4		
	024	442	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	9/28/90		روم در که در کار		
	025	443	777777	17 7777 7777		8/16/90			
	026	443	668582	R/R BFP	6/27/90	7/26/90			
	268	444	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	11/6/90			er in de la company	- 5 m +
	029	444	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	11/6/90				7
	030.	444	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	11/6/90				
	031	444	000000	HO WORK NEEDED	11/6/90				
	032	444	77?????	REMOVE BFP	17/7/90		[4]		7
	033	444	000000	HO WORK HEEDED	17/6/90				
	035	444	668893	REPLACE SFP	17/5/90	6/6/90			. :33
	036	444	667870	REPLACE 3FP	317/6/90	7/11/90			
	037	444	000000	NO. WORK NEEDED	11/6/90				
	. 038	444	000000	NOT WORK NEEDED	11/12/90		- 2		
	039:	444	668894	REPLACE BFP	一號17/12/90	6/6/9 0	217.3		
٠,	- 040L	444	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	17/12/90				-
•	067	444	000000	HOL WORK NEEDED	17/12/90				وويين المدر
	042	444	665154	PROVIDE AIR GAP	17/6/90	6/11/9 0	-3		*****
	043	444	000000	NO. WORK NEEDED	11/6/90				
	044	444	664683	PROVIDE AIR GAP	11/5/90	5/8/90			•
	045	444		CAN NOT LOCATE	11/6/90				
	046.	444	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	11/6/90			-	
	047	444	675620	REPLACE BFP	11/5/90	11/9/90			
	048	444	650351	REPAIR/REPLACE SFP	-11/6/90	6/11/90			
	050	444	000000	NO YORK NEEDED	11/6/90				
	197	444	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	11/6/90				
	220	444	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	11/5/90			•	
	236	444	675615	REPLACE BFP	11/5/90	11/12/90			
	269	444	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	11/6/90				
	###	444	667870	REMOVE BFP	- 11/6/90				
	051	447	667431	PROVIDE AIR GAP	11/10/90	7/9/90		•	
	052	447	675614	PROVIDE AIR GAP	11/10/90	11/12/90		. * -	
	054	447	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	11/9/90				
	055	447	000000	NO WORK HEEDED	11/9/90				
	145	447	668806	REPAIR SEP	11/10/90	7/20/90			
	225	447	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	11/9/90				
	231	447	675618	PROVIDE AIR GAP	11/10/90	11/12/90			
	034	460	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	11/7/90				
	163	460	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	11/7/90				

NOW PSZ BUILDING BACKFLOW PREVENTER (BFP) SURVEY/REPLACEMENT PHASE

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	EQ#	3L0#	MWC#	DESCRIPTICM	SURVEY COMPL	HNG WRITTEN	REVIEW	FINAL	DESIGN	E
	164	460	666834	REPLACE BFP	11/7/90	7/6/90		1.	e ieni	
	165	460	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	11/7/90		.23		-	
	166	460	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	11/7/90					
	167	460	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	11/7/90		•	-CH STORE SALES	المداعة شهركانى بطبيه	•••
	168	460	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	11/7/90				- ,	
	169	460	667089	INSTALL PROPER BFP	11/7/90	6/17/90		Same to the second		*
	171	460	666862	REPLACE BFP	17/6/90	6/28/90	143			
	179	460	675585	PROVIDE AIR GAP	17/6/90	11/12/90		-		
	022	850	669764	REPAIR/REPLACE SFP	17/13/90	7/30/90		مانون جونون مانون مونون مونون		ام نوردد . معروب
	094	850		CAN NOT LOCATE	17/13/90		•	عبد عدلاً ماسداد. رامانه		
	232	850	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	17/13/90					
	Z 39	850	675704	PROVIDE AIR GAP	11/13/90	11/13/90				
	253	850°		CAN NOT LOCATE	- 17/13/90					
	256	850	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	11/13/90		-	ا المام المام ا		
	06Z	865	000000	NOT WORK HEEDED	<u>:: 17/14/90</u>					پي د اد و ده
•	063	865	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	17/14/90					
-	064	865	675700	PROVIDE AIR GAP	17/14/90	11/14/90				ر منها اند. در اند
	065	865	654966	REPAIR/REPLACE BFP	- 11/14/90	1/17/90				، الجنيزة سو
	Q19 ⁻	881		CAM NOT LOCATE	11/13/90					
•	OZ1	881	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	17/13/90					•
	056	881	659830	REPAIR/REPLACE BEP	11/13/90	3/5/90		**	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
	057	881	659829	REPAIR/REPLACE BEP	11/13/90	3/5/90				
	###	881	675694	PROVIDE AIR GAP	11/14/90	11/14/90				<u> </u>
	###	881	675695	PROVIDE AIR GAP	11/14/90	11/14/90				و و رفعه ر
	058	883	652698	BACKFLOW PREVENTER	17/14/90	11/30/90	•	······		
	059	883	654967	REPAIR/REPLACE SFP	11/14/90	1/17/90				
	060	883	675703	PROVIDE AIR GAP	17/14/90	11/14/90		_	•	•
	259	883	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	17/14/90					
	260	883	675822	PROVIDE AIR GAP	11/13/90	11/15/90				
	261	883	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	11/14/90					
	067	886	665148	PROVIDE AIR GAP	11/14/90	4/16/90	•		•	. ~
	068	886	665149	PROVIDE AIR GAP	17/14/90	4/16/90		•		
	180	386	000000	NO WORK HEEDED	11/14/90			•		
	061	389	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	11/14/90				•	. •
	Z48	920	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	9/28/90			•		
	036	995	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	9/28/90					
	073	995	000000	NO WORK NEEDED	9/28/90					
	3.3				=					

BACKFLOW PREVENTER STUDY SCHEDULE (Revision)

						RESP.
	MILEST	TONE	START	END	STATUS	ORG.
	PHASE	1	n ee	4 4 ja	j jak	
	1.	Develop CDH Cross Connection Compliance Form	4/23/90	5/2/90	Complete	FE
. •	2.	Survey Existing BFP (Bldg_ 559 & 707)	4/25/90	5/7/90	Complete	FE
- - -	3.	Survey Existing BFP (Bldg. 771, 776/777, & 779)		5/23/90	Complete	FE
: ::-	4 -	Survey Existing BFP (Bldg. 371, 374 & 774)	5/24/90	6/8/90	Complete	FE
	5_	Survey Existing BFP (Other Hazardous Facilities)	6/11/90	I2/01/90	Complete	FE
	6.	Survey Existing BFP (ATI Other Buildings)	7/17/90	12/01/90	Complete	FE
~	7-	and the second s	5/7/90	10/01/91	Rev_Date	Mtce_
	PHASE	II:				
	8_	Field Verify Deficient BFP	5/8/90	5/23/90	Complete	FE
	9.	Replace Deficient BFP	5/15/90	10/01/91	Rev_Date	Mtce.
	PHASE	III:	i de la companya de La companya de la co			
	10	Evaluate Overall DW System (Pu Buildings)	5/21/90	6/01/91	Rev. Date	FE/SA & RA
	11.	Evaluate Overall DW System (400, 800 & 900 Complexes)	8/21/90	6/01/91	Rev_ Date	FE/SA & RA
	12.	Evaluate Overall DW System (100, 300, 500 & 600 Complexes)	11/21/90	6/01/91	Rev. Date	FE/SA & RA
	13.	Install BFP	6/15/90	10/01/91	Rev. Date	Mtce.
	14.	Create CADD Drawings of Overall DW System	8/1/90	10/01/91	Rev. Date	FE

CROSS CONNECTION CONTROL PROGRAM VERIFICATION/INSTALLATION RESPONSIBILITIES

INDIVIDUAL	V. Terkun	T, L. Foppe	(See list of Operations Managers)
			#45.4 19.5 (1). 19.5 19.5 19.5 19.5 19.5 19.5 19.5 19.
RESPONSIBIL ITIES	o Survey Existing BFPs o Evaluate Deficiencies o Field Verify DW Systems o Develop Line Diagrams o Evaluate Overall DW Systems o Generate Designs	o Evaluate Overall DW Systems	o Maintenance of the state of Install BFPs in Buildings under their responsibilities
ORGANIZATION	l. Facilities Engineering	2, Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment	3. Operations Managers

OPERATIONS MANAGERS

	Analytical Operations	J. A. Gels x7088, B/779, Fax 2982	528 780 659 780A 705 780B 779 865												12/03/90
	Analyli			Non-Plutonium Operations	K. G. Tallman x4350, B/460, Fax 4845	439D A 440 B 460		,				-			
	Wasie Repacking & Solidification	J. D. Hoberts x8129, 788/Ponds/ Pads/Tents, Fax 4048	onds 903A ents 903 PAD 904B	No	K. x4350,	438 439A 439B	Support Services Area II	J. R. Cable x7498, B/750, Fax 7540		707B 850	Ä.	_	~	765 968	
2.	Š *		207 Ponds 750 Tents 775 788	Non-Plutonium Operations	R. G. Johnson x7418, B/444, Fax 5513	828 883A 866 883B 860 883D 883 888	Support	J. R. x7498, B/7		118 372A 121 372A T121 375		•	128 549A	260 650	
	Wasie Assay & Shipping	G. E. Trump x7945, B/664, Fax 6668	669 668 670 668 664 668B	-: -:		998 444 997 445 998 447 999 448			_	Σ.				• •	
			888 888 888 888 888	Pu Fabrication/ Pyrochemical Ops	P. B. Yela x7371, B/707, Fax 7311	707 777 95 730 776 95 731 991 95 732 964 95	Support Services Area I	J. R. Marschall x2715, 8/331, Fax 5279	3348 335	150 441 663 T230 441A 690A-M 250 442A 2075	446	452A-G	. 199	331 651A 965 331A 652 987	653
	Regulated & Sanitary Waste	J. A. Clucci x5841, B/750, Fax 4388	219 882 810 301 884 930 308 885 931 750A 887 832 775 904A 933	Bula		<u>.</u>	dns	J. x2715,		100	A-B		_	122 3	on l
	osto	wer Fax 5716		Material Processing Support	D. R. Jackson k4749, B/371, Fax 7432	371 376 381	tem s	th ax 5662		713 867 715 868			/83 890 784 928	785 985	
	Solid Waste Treatment	J. M. Bower x6679, 19776, Fax 5716	776 689 809 A 208	poessing	ben Fax 4942	771E 771J 771F 771K 771G 771L	Ullillias Bystems	T. J. Smith x2537, W124, Fax 6662	443 A-D 450	453 453	455 570	462	515 662	517	555 710
	Hquid Wasta Treatment	F. P. McMorus x7729, B/374, Fax 4579	226 231A 774 227 231B 910 228A 374 964 228B 428 231 732	Material Processing	J. L. Hobert x5001, B/771, Fax 4942	218 771A 714 771B 728 771C 770 771D	5		124	218	224	253	254	776	427

INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

DATE:

December 4, 1990

1-021

FROM:

R. G. Chain

TO:

Backflow Preventer Study File

SUBJECT:

CROSS CONNECTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

REFERENCE: November 21, 1990 Telcom with Colorado Department of Health

(CDH) Representative

PURPOSE:

The purpose of the letter is to document the telephone conference conversation on Wednesday November 21, 1990 between Glenn Bodnar of the CDH, Ms. Annette Barnard of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Mr. Vtc Terkun of EG&G Rocky Flats, and myself. The purpose of the conversation was to get clarification on CDH reporting requirements and apparent conflicts between regulatory documents published by the State of Colorado.

-DISCUSSIONS:

It is our understanding that the following paraphrased questions and answers accurately summarized Mr. Bodnar's replies to our (DOE and EG&\$) questions.

- How do we resolve conflicts between the definition of a cross I_ Q: connection in the Colorado "Primary Drinking Water Regulations" (PDWR) and the Colorado "Cross Connection Control Manual" (CCCM).
 - The PDWR takes precedence, legally. A:
 - Should EG&G Rocky Flats report each discovered cross Q: connection within ten days of discovery as required by the PDWR, section 11.1.2, paragraph 5?
 - No. Where an organization has a documented program for A: identification and remediation of cross connections, CDH prefers to get a periodic status report.
 - EGAG Rocky Flats is installing Reduced-Pressure-Principle 3. 0: (RPP) backflow preventers at the domestic water service entrance to all buildings in order to meet requirements of section 4.10 of the Colorado CCCM, and because it seems to be good engineering practice. Does the Colorado PPWR or CCCM identify this as correction of an existing cross connection?
 - No. That requirement was written to protect the drinking A: water supply system when the water purveyer and operator of a premise (building) are two separate entities. Where the purveyer and user are on entity (as Rocky Flats), backflow preventers at building service entrances are not required.

December 4, 1990 1-021sak Page 2

- 4. Q: Where the CCCM requires a double-check valve to isolate a fire protection sprinkler piping system not containing chemicals, does a cross connection exist if only a single check valve is in place?
 - A: Yes.
- The Colorado PDWR & CCCM divide cross connections into two categories, health hazard and non-health hazard. Since fire protection sprinkler systems not containing toxic chemicals are defined as non-health hazard in the CCCM, are we justified in making those a Tower priority and dealing with them after we complete repair/replacement/installation of RPP backflow preventers in potential health hazard situations?
 - A: Yes_

CONCLUSION:

In summary, EG&G Rocky Flats is under the impression that CDH is satisfied with the cross connection remediation program at Rocky flats. Regular reports will be made of our progress.

RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS:

No response is required.

RGC:sak

cc:

V. Issaian

V. Terkun





JOINT COMPANY - UNION SAFETY COMMITTEE

Date:

August 23, 1990

To:

From:

E. I. Tietenberg / S. Cordova, J.C.U.S.C., T-690-G, Ext. 7620/5800

Subject:

INTERIM LETTER FOR SAFETY CONCERN NUMBER 90-012 / POSSIBLE WATER

CROSS CONTAMINATION

After several meetings, Facilities Engineering (FE) has proposed a study to address the issue what are the governing codes, how do they impact on the plant and whether a code violation exists.

Please review the study and let us know if it satisfies your concern. If there are any issues not addressed or any questions that have not been answered, the J.C.U.S.C. will be happy to convene a meeting where the questions can be answered.

cmp

Attachments:

- A. E. I. Tietenberg/S. Cordova ltr to M. G. Borge, Backflow Preventers, August 14, 1990
- B. Facilities Engineering Evaluation Of Code Requirements Pertaining To Backflow Preventers On Emergency Safety Showers
- C. R. C. Lerche 1tr to P. J. Suniewick, Backflow Preventers, March 23, 1990
- D. Radiological Engineering Evaluation of Employee Suggestion 90-012

cc:

- G. W. Coles
- S. Cordova
- R. C. Cordova
- J. P. Jens
- T. F. Lewis
- J. R. Majestic
- R. B. Wilkinson

updat012.et

JCUSC/PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE VERIFICATION FORM

STATEMENT OF CONCERN.	BUILDING NO 334 INITIATOR	Ų
- CONCERN:	POSS. CONTAMINATION (WATE	A)
VERIFICATION D	DETAIL - Describe the actions taken to reach a conclusion on this concern.	
	ACTIONS ARE COMPLETED.	
to the section of the		
	The state of the s	
Check One		
Pending - Process	roposed actions are not completed, due dates for actions have passed. actions are not completed, but due dates for actions have not passed. I nsufficient data in file to verify.	
VERIFICATION BY	V. Bulke	1-1-
ICUSC APPROVAL BY	DATE 4/	7/9
distribution:		
CUSC		



INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

February 3, 1990

DKP-04-9b.9

DATE

EBOM.

K. Freiberg, 8334

D. K. Pegram

SUBJECT CROSS CONNECTION - BACK FLOW PREVENTER FAILURES DOMESTIC WAITER SUPPLY SYSTEM - POTENTIAL FOR BACK SIPHONAGE OF CONTAMINATION INTO PLANT DRINKING WATER SYSTEM

Recently Industrial Hygiene identified a number of concerns regarding the back flow preventer inspection and maintenance on the plant site. These deficiencies need to be corrected in order to protect the health of plant employees and conform with Colorado Drinking Water Regulations.

Finding #1:

Preventative Maintenance employees conducting back flow preventer inspections are untrained and not certified.

Solution #1:

Preventative Maintenance employees that are inspecting back flow preventers must attend an approved training program and become certified. maintenance supervision is planning to send it's inspectors to a training class in March.

There is no plant standard for a procedure in conformance with Colorado Department of Health Standards for inspection of back flow preventers, delineation of responsibility for maintaining the program, worker training requirements, inspection frequency, repair or replacement, and engineering desian.

Solution #2:

A standard needs to be prepared by Plant Maintenance Engineering with concurrence by Facilities Engineering.

3. Freiberg OKP-01-90.10 February 8, 1990 Page 2

Finding #3:

the repair of failed back flow preventers is not receiving maintenance priority at the appropriate level. Failed back flow preventers are not being repaired or replaced within Colorado Department of Health restrictions of two weeks. Currently there are 70 failed back flow preventers with work orders dating back to November, 1989.

Solution #3:

All work orders that are generated as a result of a failed back flow preventer inspection report must be stamped as a priority 1 safety item by the area safety engineer. An auditable tracking system indicating the status of each back flow preventer must be developed. No back flow preventer shall be allowed to continue to be operated in an unsafe condition.

Non-compliance will result in the suspension of use of domestic water in the affected area by Industrial Hygiene. If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at X7098.

Authority: DOE Order 6430.1 and 5480.4 40 CFR 141-143

TO PART OF THE LABOR.

Colo. Part I Title 25 CRS 1973

T. F. Lewis

February 8, 1990

ksh

**

Marie le

J. WEEPEY

EGEG ROCKY FLATS





JOINT COMPANY - UNION SAFETY COMMITTEE

December 19, 1990

recogniz.012

To:

J. P. Jens

Assistant General Manager

Health and Safety

T-130-G Ext. 3080 From: E. I. Tietenberg / S. Cordova

Co-Chairmen

JCUSC

T-452-B / T-690-G Ext. 7620 / Ext. 5800

RE: SPECIAL RECOGNITION FROM GENERAL MANAGER OR ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER,

HEALTH AND SAFETY

In January 1990, Mr. Suggestion pertaining to possible cross-contamination of potable water. Subsequently, they brought the issue to the attention of the Joint Company/Union Safety Committee (JCUSC) where a Safety Concern 90-012 was filed. Investigation by E. I. Tietenberg and S. Cordova revealed that the issue was broader than originally identified. The major concern was the possibility of the plants not complying with the requirements of the Colorado Department of Health (CDH) Cross-Connection Control Manual.

The JCUSC requested Facilities Engineering to evaluate the requirements and to verify compliance. This effort began in June of 1990 and was completed on August 14, 1990. The evaluation revealed no direct violations, but numerous deficiencies. Corrective actions were identified in a letter from J. A. Kirkebo, EG&G, to R. M. Nelson, Jr., DOE, subject: Colorado Health Department Request For Cross-Connection Control Survey, December 6, 1990.

The initiative and concern of by Mr. figured directly in the evaluation of the potable/drinking water system at the Rocky Flats Plant, and will result in numerous repairs and replacements of backflow preventers, thus enhancing the health of all employees at the plant. Total estimated cost for the project is anticipated to be between 2.0 and 2.5 million dollars.

Please advise on the appropriate recognition for the efforts of Mr. Mr. whose persistence resulted in a successful resolution of the safety concern.

Attached please find copies of all documentation we have in the files on this concern.

cmp

Attachments: As Stated

cc:

G. G. Balint J. R. Majestic A. H. Burlingame

B. M. Clausen


R. C. Cordova

J. R. Marschall

P. North

J. M. Wilson

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BUILDING MAIN SHUT OFF VALVE #1

EXAMPLE

D WHEN MAIN BUILDING SHUT OFF VALUE (#1) is OFF FOR BUILDING REPAIR OR REMODLE AND SYSTEM BEING DRAWED, SOMEONE USES EMERGENCY SHOWER OR EYE BATH (#2) AS WATER I DRAINS TO LOW LOCATIONS (#3,4,5) AIRBORNEY CONTAMINATION WILL BE SUCKED THROUGH THE UNPROTECTED EMERGENCY FIXTURES (#2) IN CONTROLLED AREA INTO DOMESTIC WATER SYSTEM UNDER VACUUM. 2 THE AIRBORNE CONTAMINATION AND DOMESTIC

WATER WILL BE IN THE SAME DOMESTIK WATER SYSTEM

(3) ANY LOWER FIXTURE (3,4,5,) DRINKING FOUNTAIN, LAVATORY'S Etc, COULD DISCHARGE THE CONTAMINATED WATER WHILE DRAINING WHEN WATER PRESSURE IS TURNED BACK ON (#1) TO THE SYSTEM THE CONTAMINATE WATER WILL DISCHARGE THROUGH DOMESTIC FIXTURES (#3,4,5) UNDER PRESSURE 5 CONSIDERING BUILDING WATER SYSTEMS ARE SHUT DOWN FOR ANT PURPOSES (REPAIRS, REMODLES, ETC) THIS TYPE OF CROSS -CONNECTION COULD OCCURE AT ANY TIME **(** LOCATION OF THESE EMERGENCY FIXTURES IN CONTROLLED AREAS ARE PLANTWIDE KNOWN EXAMPLES ARE: BLDG 559 BY Room 103 A BLDG 559 BY Room 101 B BLDG 776 BY ROOM 161-A BLDG 776 BY ROOM 154 BETWEEN COL. G-ZW AND FZW NEAR F-3W BLOG TIG BY Room 154-A BLDG 776 BY ROOM 134 COL D-8 HOSE IS CONNECTED WITH NO BACKFLOW PREVENTER BLDG 776 BY Room 156 AN APPROVED BACKFLOW DEVISE SHOULD BE INSTALLED PER INDIVIDUAL FIXTURE (\mathcal{B}) IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ON THIS SUGGESTION PLEASE CONTACK BUCK CHOI OR TED KOOOL AT 2720 OR 7839

IF SKETCH IS NECESSARY ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEET

EF-47031A -12 39)

DESTROY PREVIOUS ISSUES

COLURADO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

- 5.2 Backflow prevention devices installations shall be inspected and approved for use by the .ATTHORITY HAVING JURISDICTION: Inspections can be scheduled by calling () at least 24 hours in advance of the desired inspection time. See Section 3.8.
- 5.3 All backflow devices shall be installed in the horizontal position. Variance by review only on retrofit fire systems.
- A prassure vacuum breaker shall be used where the device is never subjected to backpressure and installed a minimum of twelve (13) inches above the highest bloing or outlat downstream of the levice in a manner to preclude backpressure.
- 5.5 An atmospheric vacuum breaker shall be used only where the device is:
- 5.5.1 Never subjected to continuous pressure (more than 12 bours continuous).
- 5.5.2 Installed with the air inlet in a level position and a minimum of six (6) inches above the highest piping or outlet it is protecting.
- 5.5.3 <u>No.valves</u> shall be permitted downstream of the device.
- 5.6 The single check valve is not considered to be a back low prevention device.
 - 5.7 Double check valve assemblies may be installed in below grade vaults when these vaults are properly constructed in accordance with Drawings 1 through 9.
 - Reduced pressure backflow preventers will be installed above ground. The unit should be placed at least twelve inches (12) above the finish grade to allow clearance for the repair work. A concrete slab at finish grade is recommended. Proper drainage should be provided for the relief valve and may be piped away from the location, provided it is readily visible from above grade and the relief valve is separated from the drainline by a minimum of double the diameter of the supply line. A modified vault installation may be used if constructed with ample side clearances. Freezing is a major problem in this area. Precautions should be taken to protect above ground installations.

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- 2.3 Ordes John Potion Johntol Johnittee, Paying Northwest Jestion AVVA Marks of Appepted Procedures and Practices.
- 2.4 Recommented Proctice for Backflow Prevention and Orose Connection Control AVVA Manual M11.
- 2.5 Definitions of terms used in this regulation are those contained in "Colorado Department of Health Cross Johnsotton Manual". Available for neview at (ADDRESS OF LOCAL AUTHORITY)

3.0 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS:

3.1 Suilding plans submitted to the (LOCAL SUILDING DEPARTMENT) will be reviewed by the Gross Connection Control Section, and approved prior to the issuance of a building permit.

BUILDING PLANS RUST SHOW:

- 3.1.1 Vater service size and Instalion
- 3.1.2 Meter size and location
- 3.1.3 Backflow prevention device size, type and location.
- 3.1.4 Fire sprinkling system(s) service line, size and type of backflow prevention device.
- Backflow prevention devices are to be installed in an accessible locations to facilitate maintenance, testing and repair. Drawings 1 through 10 show various installations.
- 3.3 All backflow prevention devices shall be installed immediately downstream of the water meter.
- 3.4 Before installing a backflow prevention device, pipelines should be thoroughly flushed to remove foreign material.
- 3.5 In no case will it be permissible to have connections or tees between the meter and service line backflow prevention device.
- In no case is it permiss the to connect the relief .


 Yazyana scharge on the indeed pressure device
 Into a sump, drainage diton, etc.
- Backflow prevention valves are not to be used as the inlet or outlet valve of the water meter. Test cooks are not to be used as supply connections.
- 3.8 In order to insure that backflow prevention

COLURADU DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, INSTALLATION OF REDUCED PRESSURE BACKFLOW PREVENTERS


Reduced pressure backflow preventers will be installed above ground.

(Fig. A) The unit should be placed at least twelve inches (12") above the finish grade to allow clearance for repair work. A concrete slau at finish grade is recommended. Proper drainage should be provided for the relief valve and may be piped away from the location, provided it is readily visible from above grade and the relief valve is separated from the drain line by a minimum of double the diameter of the supply line. A modified vault installation may be used if constructed with ample side clearances. (Fig. B)

ABOVE GROUND INSTALLATION



MODIFIED VAULT INSTALLATION



9

1 3 2

Fic.

COUR CENT OF HEALTH DRING NATIVE SECTION CROSS COMMESTION CONTROL

INSTALLATION OF REDUCED

PRESSURE BACKFLOW PRESURNITIONS PROGRAMME

D # C 40

"是我这样还是我看着我的一个,我们就是这种的人,我们还是这个人,我们就是我们的人,

470

5

PROBLESS WATER TITES.

SPRIN VALUE.

BACKFLOW PREVETOR RELIEF

OPENING.

TO JANITOR'S SLOP IT REQUIRES AIRGAP

SINK ABOUT 25' AWAY. TO TEST & RUNCTION THE

DEVICE PROPERLY.

SOLUATION: PROVIDE AIR GAR AT THE RELIEUE

DISCHARGE OPENING THE AND DIS CONNEC

THE DRAID LINE AT THE PROCESS WATE

LINE DRAIN UALUE

SAFETY CONCERN WORKSHEET (Please Print)

GENERAL INFORMATION:	
(*2) Date Received: _ \ _ \ _ \ _ \ _ \ _ \ _ \ _ \ _ \ _	(*1) Number: 90-012(_)
(3) Priority (H,M,L): LA	
(*4) Title: POSS, Contam. W.	ater
(5) Initiated by:	(6) Emp. Number:
(*7) Initiation/Start Date: _l_ / _l_ / _	(8) Emp. Phone No:
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION:	
(9*) Supervisor/Person Resp: B. C	napman (*10) Phone: 2720
(11) Date Supervisor Answered: ZZZZ	
	berg (13) Phone: 2372
(14) Bldg: 334 (15) Bldg.	Manager: S.K. Stovall
SAFETY NOTIFICATIONS:	
	(17) Date: _ [/ _ [] / 90
(16) Discipline: J.M. Langs	(1) '
(18) Area Safety Eng. S.M. Nesta	
(19) Union Steward: S. Condovo	
(20) Co. Co-Chairman: 2 Tietenbe	
(21) Union Co-Chair: S. Cordova	
(22) Company Member: E. Tietenio	ero Bldg: TYSZB
(23) Union Member: S. Coydova	
INVESTIGATION STATUS:	
(25) Date Contacted Employee: / /	
(*26) Investigation Comments:	
(*27) Invest But a	
(*27) Invest. Review/Due Date: /	
(29) Actions Indent. (Y or N): (
(*31) Close Date: / / (*32)	Closed By:
To be filled out when submitting action	items

JOINT COMPANY/UNION SAFETY COMMITTEE CONCERN FORM

(Use Black Ink Only & Retain Copy For Your Records) Mail: JCUSC, T690G

	Cas	se No. <u>90 -</u>	012
EMPLOYEE N	AME EMPLOYEE N		
DEPARTMENT	. PMO BLDG. 334 PHONE -	SHIFT	1
	(Print) BUD CHAPMAN SUPV. EXT.		
	RT MANAGER (Print) KEN FRIEBERG MANAGER EXT.		
I have previous	ly discussed this Concern with Supervision: X Yes No.		
Concern (brief	y) POSSIBLE CROSS CONNECTIONS BETWEEN AIR BO	RN RADIO A	CTIVE
CONTAMI	NATION AND DOMESTIC WATER SYSTEM THROUGH UNPRO	TECTED EME	RGENCY
	AND EYE BATH FIXTURE IN RADIO ACTIVE CONTROLLE	D AREA.	
(THIS S	AFETY CONCERN SHOULD HAVE IMMEDIATE ACTION)		
	1-11-90	1-	11-9
p,	Date Steward Signature	D.	ate
Supervision R	esponse (within 5 working days)		
	•		
Supervision Si	gnature	5.	
		Date	
Direct Report N	fanager Signature	. Date	
NOTE THE			
	NESS IN COMPLETING THIS FORM IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE.		
	atisfied with the results I am not satisfied.		
Brief reason if	not satisfied:		
Employee Sign	ature	Date	
JCUSC receive	d Safety Concern on:		
	To be completed by the JCUSC Co-Chairperson(s)		
Assigned to:	Union: TRUE LERTOUR	Date / -//-	-90
	Union: The CONTOCA Company: EXX TIETEL BERG	Date / -//.	-90
Distribution:	Safety Committee (White)	-	
Distribution.	Union Steward (Green)		
	Employee (Goldenrod)		
RF-45500 (Rev. 10	89) Destroy Previous Issues		

INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

DATE

August 14, 1990

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E. I. Tietenberg/S. Cordova

FROM

M. G. Bogre, Plant Utilities Engineering, x7048

SUBJECT

BACKFLOW PREVENTERS ON EMERGENCY EYEWASHES AND SAFETY

SHOWERS

Employee Suggestion No. 90-012 contained an expression of concern over the issue of backflow preventers on Emergency Eyewash and Safety Shower units in radioactive controlled areas. Facilities Engineering was requested to examine this issue from a code compliance standpoint. The results of this investigation are presented in the attached document, "Facilities Engineering Evaluation of Code Requirements Pertaining to Backflow Preventers on Emergency Safety Showers". I hope you find this report helpful. If you have any questions regarding this document, please call me at extension 7048.

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FACILITIES ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF CODE REQUIREMENTS PERTAINING TO BACKFLOW PREVENTERS ON EMERGENCY SAFETY SHOWERS

(REF: EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION 90-012)

BACKGROUND

Employee Suggestion 90-012 contains an expression of concern over the possibility of cross connections existing between airborne radioactive contaminants and the domestic water system. The contention is made that under certain extraordinary conditions backflow could occur and air could be drawn into the piping through the emergency safety shower (and safety eye wash) fixtures in radioactive-controlled areas. This could lead to the possibility of airborne radioactive particulates entering the domestic water lines. The employee suggestion contains the proposal that in order to reduce the potential for this type of cross connection, reduced pressure type backflow prevention devices should be installed at all emergency safety showers in radioactive-controlled areas.

A legal opinion has been expressed [RCL-1(76)-90 memo from R. C. Lerche to P. J. Suniewick, 6-23-90 (attached)] that Rocky Flats is under no statutory obligation to comply with any state or local codes, regulations or other requirements, concerning backflow prevention, because the Rocky Flats Plant does not supply drinking water to the public. However, this opinion suggests that DOE Order 6430.1A requires that Rocky Flats comply with the Safe Drinking Water Act and all other state, regional and local requirements.

INTRODUCTION

Facilities Engineering (FE) has been asked to determine which, if any, codes, regulations or requirements are applicable to the problem of backflow prevention in emergency safety showers (and eyewashes). The primary document chosen for guidance in this task is the Colorado Department of Health Cross Connection Control Manual. This manual contains the laws, codes and regulations pertaining to cross connection control, along with case histories and other relevant information. The Colorado Cross Connection Control Manual borrows heavily from the Uniform Plumbing Code (U.P.C.) which is the model plumbing code for the State of Colorado. Rocky Flats Plant standards (SMU 100,101,102) and ANSI standards (Z358.1-1990) were also studied.

EVALUATION

No codes or regulations have been located which specifically require backflow prevention devices for emergency safety shower (or eyewash) applications. The absence of specific code or regulatory requirements dictates that an evaluation be made of the more general code requirements in order to determine whether or not backflow preventers are required for emergency safety showers.

Examination of the various code requirements indicates that a certain amount of risk-based interpretation is implied in the wording of the codes and that the primary intent of all such codes is to protect health. This approach is supported implicitly by the Safe Drinking Water Act 1986, which states in part:

National interim primary drinking water regulations promulgated

under paragraph (1) shall protect health to the extent feasible, using technology, treatment techniques and other means, which the Administrator determines are generally available (taking costs into consideration) on the date of enactment of this title.

The Safe Drinking Water Act appears to allow for the exercise of a certain amount of reasonable informed judgement on the part of the administrator as to what constitutes a threat to health and what measures are feasible and readily available to safeguard health. The inclusion of the clause "taking costs into consideration" implies that an engineering analysis of cost vs risk is an integral part of the process of formulating regulations under this Act.

DOE Order 6430.1A also contains general policy guidelines which allow for the exercise of professional engineering judgement when making decisions concerning code requirements. (See Appendix V, 7. Policy and Objectives, 0101-1 General, 0101-2 Criteria Deviations.)

The FE position is also reflected in DOE Order 6430.1A, Section 1540-1.5 <u>SAFETY DEVICES</u> which states in part:

"Backflow preventers and air gaps shall be used to prevent cross connection (contamination) of potable water supplies. Vacuum breakers (to prevent back siphonage) shall be used only in conjunction with administrative controls."

This indicates to FE that the main concern of DOE Order 6410.1A is the prevention of contamination of potable water supplies. This is also the main concern of FE. Contamination is, by definition, impairment of the quality of potable water to a degree which creates an actual hazard to the public health (APPENDIX, II, 13). DOE Order 6430.1A specifies that for existing facilities original design criteria apply in general and that this Order (DOE 6430.1A) only applies to new facilities, additions and modifications. (See Appendix V, 0101-1, General.)

The case can also be made for a risk-based evaluation of the codes by examining the definitions used in formulating the codes. For reference, several relevant definitions taken from the Colorado Cross Connection Control Manual and the U.P.C. are presented in the Appendix.

In addition, the Uniform Plumbing Code contains the following rather general definitions and requirements.

(k) Cross Connection - A cross connection is any connection or arrangement, physical or otherwise, between a potable water supply system and any plumbing fixture or any tank, receptacle, equipment or device, through which it may be possible for non-potable, used, unclean, polluted and contaminated water, or other substances, to enter into any part of such potable water system under any condition.

CHAPTER 10 - WATER DISTRIBUTION

SECTION 1002 - UNLAWFUL CONNECTIONS

(a) No installation of potable water supply piping or part

thereof shall be made in such a manner that it will be possible for used, unclean, polluted or contaminated water, mixtures or substances to enter any portion of such piping from any tank, receptable, equipment or plumbing fixture by reason of backsiphonage, by suction or any other cause, either during normal use and operation thereof or when any such tank, receptable, equipment or plumbing fixture is flooded or subject to pressure in excess of the operating pressure in the hot or cold water piping.

(b) No plumbing fixture, device or construction shall be installed or maintained or shall be connected to any domestic water supply, when such installation or connection may provide a cross connection between a distributing system of water for drinking and domestic purposes and water which may become contaminated by such plumbing fixture, device or construction unless there is a provided backflow prevention device approved for the potential hazard.

Section 1002(a) of the U.P.C. appears to deal with future installations, whereas 1002(b) also prohibits maintaining systems (apparently existing) which may provide a cross connection. Section 1002(b) leaves it to the user to determine which backflow prevention device has been "approved for the potential hazard."

The broad wording contained in these definitions and codes, if interpreted literally would require backflow preventers for every plumbing fixture in the plant because by these definitions almost any fixture could be considered a cross connection. A hazard to health does not have to exist for an arrangement or fixture to be considered a cross connection.

The requirements contained in the Colorado Cross Connection Control Manual seem to be concerned primarily with the problem of cross connections between the potable water system and impure, contaminated or polluted water (or other objectionable liquids). Little consideration is given to the possibility of backflow of air occurring and the attendant risk of airborne pollutants or contaminants entering the potable water system. This is very apparent when the air gap separation method of backflow prevention is examined.

The air gap separation method is a recommended protection against backflow in many situations. It is widely used and is generally quite effective in preventing the backsiphonage of liquids into the potable water supply. However, it is easy to imagine a scenario in which backflow of air could occur. This brings up the possibility of airborne gases or particulates entering a potable water supply. The introduction of these gases or particulates could cause pollution or contamination of the potable water supply. The fact that an air gap separation is an approved method of backflow prevention while at the same time constituting a cross connection by the literal U.P.C. definition indicates that the U.P.C. allows for a certain amount of risk-based interpretation of the codes and definitions contained therein.

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that the U.P.C. and other codes are subject to a certain amount of interpretation and that any evaluation of the

codes must be risk-based.

FE believes that certain ideas are implied in the codes even when not stated explicitly, i.e., by the U.P.C. definition of cross connection the possibility of any substance being introduced into the system constitutes a cross connection. In the view of FE, this implicitly refers to the introduction of substances of such a nature or in such levels as to constitute a hazard to the potability of the water supply, even though this is not so stated in the code.

Certainly, anyone with an active imagination could visualize some highly unlikely scenario in which almost any plumbing fixture anywhere could be considered a cross connection by the U.P.C. definition. It is obvious, however, that in general plumbing practice some judgement is allowed concerning likelihood of risk or degree of hazard when evaluating the plumbing codes. Therefore, in the absence of any specific requirements concerning backflow preventers on emergency safety showers in radioactive-controlled areas, FE feels it is the responsibility of the purveyor (Rocky Flats Plant) to exercise reasonable, informed judgement in assessing the degree of hazard posed by the arrangement in question, and then proceed accordingly. This being the position of FE, refer to the assessment which Radiological Engineering produced concerning the degree of risk that is posed by the present emergency safety shower arrangement. That assessment recommends that no modification to the existing system be made. [See "Radiological Engineering Evaluation of Employee Suggestion 90-012" (attached)]

It is apparent from examination of the various codes that the codes are general enough as to allow for different interpretations. This being the case, FE has attempted to divine the "spirit of the law" and use that basis to evaluate "the letter of the law." FE feels that the spirit of the law is more important than the letter of the law and that the spirit of the law is to protect health. This is also the main concern of FE. In keeping with the EG&G commitment to improving the safety of the workplace wherever feasible, FE will comply with DOE Order 6430.1A, and give careful consideration to potential cross connection-related health hazards in all existing and future installations. FE designs will incorporate backflow preventers wherever it is determined that the risk to health is to the degree that such protection is warranted.

Mike Bogre Plant Utilities Engineering 27 July 1990

APPENDIX

I. SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT - 1986

TITLE XIV - "SAFETY OF PUBLIC WATER SUPPLIES" SECTION 1412 - NATIONAL DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS

National interim primary drinking water regulations promulgated under paragraph (1) shall protect health to the extent feasible, using technology, treatment techniques and other means, which the Administrator determines are generally available (taking costs into consideration) on the date of enactment of this title.

II. COLORADO CROSS CONNECTION CONTROL MANUAL

- 1. "Air Gap." The unobstructed vertical distance through the free atmosphere between the lowest opening from any pipe or faucet supplying water to a tank, plumbing fixture, other device or vessel and the flood level rim of said vessel.
- 13. "Contamination" means an impairment of the quality of the potable water by sewage, industrial fluids or waste liquids, compounds or other materials to a degree which creates an actual hazard to the public health through poisoning or through the spread of disease.
- 15. "Cross Connection" means any physical arrangement whereby a potable water supply is connected, directly or indirectly, with any other water supply system, sewer, drain, conduit, tank, plumbing fixture or other device which contains, or any contain, contaminated water, sewage or other waste, liquid or gas of unknown or unsafe quality which may be capable of imparting contamination or pollution to the potable water supply as a result of backflow. Bypass arrangements, jumper connections, removable spools, swivel or changeover devices, four-way valve connections and other temporary or permanent devices through which, or because of which, backflow could occur are considered to be cross connections.
- 22. "Hazard-Pollution." An actual or potential threat to the physical properties of the water system or to the potability of the public or the consumer's potable water system but which would constitute a nuisance or be aesthetically objectionable or could cause damage to the system or its appurtenances, but would not be a threat to life or be dangerous to health.
- 27. "Pollution" means the presence of any foreign substance (organic, inorganic, radiological or biological) in the water that may degrade the water quality so as to constitute a non-health type hazard or impair its usefulness.
- 28. "Potable Water" means water free from impurities in amounts sufficient to cause disease or harmful physiological effects. The bacteriological, chemical and radiological quality shall conform with State of Colorado Primary Drinking Water Regulations.

III. UNIFORM PLUMBING CODE

SECTION 103

(a) Backflow - Backflow is the flow of water or other liquids, mixture or substances into the distributing pipes of a potable supply of water from any sources other than its intended source. (See Back-Siphonage.)

(b) Backflow Connection -- Backflow connection or condition is any arrangement

whereby backflow can occur.

(c) Backflow Preventer - A backflow preventer is a device or means to prevent backflow into the potable water system.

(d) Back-Siphonage - Back-siphonage is the flowing back of used, contaminated or polluted water from a plumbing fixture or vessel into a water supply pipe due to a negative pressure in such pipe. (See Backflow.)

(k) Cross Connection - A cross connection is any connection or arrangement, physical or otherwise, between a potable water supply system and any plumbing fixture or any tank, receptable, equipment or device, through which it may be possible for non-potable, used, unclean, polluted and contaminated water, or other substances, to enter into any part of such potable water system under any condition.

SECTION 1003 - CROSS CONNECTION CONTROL

APPROVAL OF DEVICES - Before any device is installed for the prevention of backpressure or backsiphonage, it shall have first been approved by the Administration Authority. Devices shall be tested in conformity with recognized standards or other standards acceptable with the intent of this code.

IV. <u>AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD Z358.1-1990</u>

- 4.6.3 (Emergency Showers) The shower shall be assembled in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.
- 5.4.2 (Eyewash)...Units shall be installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions and acceptable plumbing practices.
- 7.4.2 (Eye/face wash)...Units shall be installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions and acceptable plumbing practices.

V. <u>DOE_ORDER_6430.1A</u>

7. POLICY AND OBJECTIVES

- a. <u>Policy</u>. It is DOE policy that:
 - (1) Professional architectural and engineering principles and practices be applied to the planning, design, construction, alterations and/or acquisition of the Department's facilities.
 - (3) The planning, design and construction of the Department's

facilities will be performed in a manner that will satisfy all applicable Executive Orders, Federal laws regulations. While the Department is not required to comply with state and local building codes, laws and ordinance, the planning, design, and construction processes should accommmodate them to the extent consistent with the accomplishment of the Department's mission.

0101-1 GENERAL

State, municipal, county and other local bulding and zoning codes and ordinances should be reviewed for possible conflicts with these criteria. While it is not mandatory that DOE projects comply with such local codes and regulations, the design professional is encouraged to cooperate with local officials and DOE personnel to accommodate the intent of local codes and regulations as much as possible.

These criteria apply to any building acquisition, new facility, facility addition and alteration, and leased facility that is required to comply with DOE 4300.1B. This includes on-site constructed buildings, preengineered buildings, plant-fabricated modular buildings and temporary facilities. For existing facilities, original design criteria apply to the structure in general; however, additions or modifications shall comply with this Order and the associated latest editions of the references herein.

0101-2 CRITERIA DEVIATIONS

DOE organizations with first-line responsibilities for facility projects shall determine to what extent these criteria shall be applied to projects in process under prior issuances of DOE 6430.1. In making determination for projects already in the planning, design, construction, operating or decommissioning phases, consideration shall include the current stage of budgeting, design or costruction and the potential cost and schedule effects of applying these criteria.

For all projects subject to DOE 6430.1 series, these criteria are not intended to impose unnecessary design restrictions or requirements or to discourage design innovation. Professional architectural and engineering judgement shall be used in the interpretation and application of these criteria to specific projects.

1540-1.5 SAFETY DEVICES

As directed by project criteria, emergency eye washes, emergency showers or combination emergency eye wash-showers shall be provided in areas where corrosive or other skin or eye irritant chemicals are stored, handled, used or dispensed. Equipment shall comply with ANSI Z358.1 and be serviced by the potable water system.

Backflow preventers and air gaps shall be used to prevent cross connection (contamination) of potable water supplies. Vacuum breakers (to prevent back-siphonage) shall be used only in conjunction with administrative controls.

INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

DATE

March 23, 1990

RCL-1(76)-90

TO

P. J. Suniewick

FROM

R. C. Lerche RCL

SUBJECT

BACKFLOW PREVENTERS

You have asked me whether Plant facilities must contain backflow preventers to prevent cross contamination.

My review of DOE Order 6430.1A indicates that the quality of domestic water within distribution systems shall be protected from degradation by installation of backflow prevention assemblies, as necessary, to preclude backflow of contaminants or pollutants into the system. (See p. 2-33)

This Order also states that "[d]omestic water conveyed within distribution systems that serve DOE facilities shall comply with the applicable SDWA (Safe Drinking Water Act), 40 CFR 141, 40 CFR 142 requirements and with all other State, regional and local requirements."

I have reviewed the Colorado Revised Statutes and can find no provision which explicitly requires backflow preventers. Even if some state provision did exist it would not be directly applicable, as a matter of state law, to the Plant's water system unless a federal statute expressly made it applicable (i.e., a "waiver of sovereign immunity"). While the Safe Drinking Water Act contains a waiver of sovereign immunity, it applies only to "federally owned or maintained <u>public water systems"</u> (42 USC 300j-6). The term "public water system" is defined at 42 USC 300f and means "a system for the provision to the of piped water for human consumption . . ." (emphasis added). It is beyond dispute that the Plant does not supply drinking water to the public. Consequently, I believe the Safe Drinking Water Act and any state law or local ordinance not to be directly applicable. Notwithstanding this conclusion, the DOE Order states these requirements must be followed. The significance of the foregoing is this: failure to implement any SDWA, state or local requirements would be contrary to the DOE Order only and therefore enforceable only through the DOE/EG&G contract.

Therefore, my advice concerning backflow preventers is this:

- 1. identify the 40 CFR 141, 142 requirements (I can provide these, if needed);
- 2. identify any "State, regional and local" requirements;
- incorporate these requirements into the design of future facilities;
- 4. ask DOE if they intend for us to retrofit existing facilities.

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RADIOLOGICAL ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION 90-012

Employee suggestion 90-012 expresses a concern that airporne radioactive contamination will be drawn through emergency shower heads when the system is drained for maintenance and thus be drawn into the drinking water lines and distributed to water fountains and showers connected to the same line. The contention is that the vacuum created when the system is drained will draw particulate matter in through the shower head and all the way down a pipe to a sanitary shower or water fountain.

FINDING: Radiological Engineering has determined that the risk of this scenario occurring is virtually non-existent due to the following reasoning:

- 1. The airborne concentrations in the process area have never approached a level where this sort of penetration is possible.
- 2. The emergency showers have valves to actuate them. This valve acts as a barrier to any particulate matter entering the pipe.
- 3. The airborne behavior of the radioactive particulate encountered onsite precludes their migration up to an inverted surface and into very small orifices.
- 4. In the postulated scenario that a particle entered the head the possibility of it traversing the piping runs, which are wet and elbowed, without plating out on the interior is virtually non-existent.
- 5. When the system is drained no venting should occur at the shower heads since the are valved off by the actuator valve. Venting will occur at the first installed vent pipe which will leave a slug of water in the pipes that are not vented.
- 6. In the postulated scenario that the shower heads did draw a vacuum this vacuum would have to be significantly greater in flow ,constant in nature, and lasting over a long period of time than that of the room negative pressure to cause particle migration to the head. This seems highly unlikely since the holes in the shower head are very small. and thus cause significant flow restriction.
- 7. If the system is inoperable due to maintenance or draining why would a person attempt to use the system knowing that there is no water.

- 7. If the postulated incident did occur the following things would have to occur simultaneously:
 - a. Incredibly high concentrations of airborne radioactivity in extremely small particle size.
 - b. Draining of the system.
 - c. The high airborne occuring in the immediate vicinity of the heads.
 - d. The vacuum being high enough to force activiation of the shower actuation valve or actuation of the shower.

Due to the above reasoning Radiological Engineering recommends that no modifications to the existing system be made and that present system does not pose any measurable risk to personnel.

Although the above concern does not identify a hazard that needs correction it does illustrate that the employees are aware that when a controlled system or environment comes into contact with an uncontrolled system or environment there is a potential for cross contamination. In this instance the cross contamination is highly improbable. The identification of these potential problems should be continually encouraged and supported. The persons submitting this concern should be thanked for their participation in the program and encouraged to continue participating.

Joseph M. Harverson Radiological Engineering January 22, 1990

cc. P. Suniewick

T. Foppe